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Executive summary
Attribution is the establishment of a causal link between (parts of) an observed change and a 
specific intervention. Attribution is a key requirement of any monitoring and results measurement 
(MRM) and evaluation activity. Donors require programmes to show whether, and to what extent, 
the results they are reporting are caused by their interventions. There are many opinions on how 
to attribute changes to interventions. This is particularly true for interventions in complex systems 
such as markets. Some practitioners and authors say that it’s not possible to attribute change 
to market system interventions, while others say that there are well-established quantitative 
methods of doing so. This paper sheds light on the current theoretical/academic and practitioner 
understanding of attribution and causality. It then suggests a typology for attribution to create a 
better understanding of when one method is more appropriate than another.
First, the paper presents a view of current attribution practice in market systems development, 
drawing on several interviews with practitioners and experts as well as on practitioner oriented 
literature. Three key themes emerged from both interviews and literature, specifically there are:
1. Conflicting views on the extent to which attribution is possible for programmes using a  
market systems approach 
2. Three common approaches for measuring attribution, and 
3. Political and practical constraints to measuring attribution. 
Practitioners have a great desire for solutions that are pragmatic rather than dogmatic. Most 
interviewed practitioners appreciate that there is no perfect way of establishing attribution. At the 
same time, they clearly wish to become better at attributing change to interventions so that they 
can use this as a tool for learning and improvement. 
The paper then presents how causality is viewed in the theoretical evaluation literature. We 
introduce three types of causality: a successionist, a configurational and a generative model.
After discussing and combining insights from both practice and theory, we suggests a pragmatic 
approach to attribution based on three central observations: 
1. A generative approach is better able to explain how the causal mechanisms work (the “why it 
worked” question).
2. A successionist approach is better at achieving a higher level of confidence in showing 
co-occurrence of cause and effect, and the size of the net effect (the “if and to what extend it 
worked” question). 
3. Perfect attribution in complex contexts is difficult (if not impossible). 
The paper then suggests a typology of approaches based on different contexts and perspectives 
on change. It discusses how this typology can be applied in market systems development 
and presents two programme case examples. This should facilitate practitioners to choose 
the methods that are most appropriate to their context and are grounded in what is currently 
understood as “good practice” in the evaluation literature. How close any programme can come 
to what would be a ‘best-fit’ in its context depends on the programme’s available resources 
for monitoring and evaluation as well as the technical capacity of the staff which a programme 
can attract. Therefore it is important to be transparent about the logic and decisions behind 
developing the attribution strategy, and limitations therein.
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This section introduces the paper’s rationale and methodology and gives an overview of 
the contents.
1.1 Rationale
How do we as development actors know whether our efforts in development in general, and in 
influencing market systems in particular, have been successful? We of course need to monitor 
for changes, measure results and evaluate the programme. Observing and measuring changes 
alone, however, does not give us the confidence that the observed and measured changes are 
due to our interventions. To achieve confidence that our interventions indeed played a role in 
achieving the change, we need to attribute the change to the intervention. Attribution is a key 
requirement of any monitoring and results measurement (MRM) and evaluation activity. Donors 
require programmes to show whether, and to what extent the results they are reporting are 
caused by their interventions.
There are many opinions on how to attribute change to interventions. This is particularly true for 
interventions in complex1 systems such as markets. Some authors say that it’s not possible, 
while others say that there are well-established quantitative methods to attribute change. 
For practitioners, this diversity of views can be confusing or unhelpful. This paper attempts to 
bring together current practice and theoretical perspectives on attribution and causality. It sug-
gests a pragmatic way forward for practitioners by doing two things:
1. Shedding light on the current theoretical/academic and practitioner understanding and 
measurement of attribution and causality.
2. Suggesting a typology for attribution to create a better understanding of when one meth-
od is more appropriate than another. Or in other words, what we can find out using a 
particular method (or family of methods) and what it (or they) cannot tell us.
Who is this paper aimed at? This research paper is aimed at professionals involved in 
commissioning and implementing evaluations, as well as monitoring and results measurement 
(MRM) professionals who are involved in developing attribution strategies for programmes using 
market systems approaches. 
What is the purpose of this paper? This paper is not a guide to attribution. It rather provides a 
basis on which to develop an attribution strategy. It does so by providing the reader with an un-
derstanding of the different perspectives on attribution, both from an academic as well as a prac-
titioner point of view. It then attempts to synthesise these perspectives into a typology that helps 
MRM and evaluation practitioners to make an informed choice about their attribution strategy.
1.2 Methodology
We first studied relevant theoretical and practical literature on attribution and causality. We drew 
on academia and practitioner-oriented literature concerned with monitoring and evaluation. 
The literature review was supplemented with 11 key informant interviews to verify the key 
findings and further refine the understanding of current practice. The interviewees included 
experienced MRM and evaluation professionals. We also interviewed evaluation scholars who 
apply a scientific understanding of attribution and causality in their work.
1.3 Overview of the paper
Section 2 of the paper frames the debates by clarifying what is meant by “attribution” and the 
related concept of “contribution” and explores attribution on different levels. 
1  See Appendix 2: Complexity and emergence
1. Introduction
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Section 3 gathers key themes and measurement challenges that emerged from the key infor-
mant interviews. Section 4 explores three different theories of causality in the evaluation litera-
ture. In Sections 5 and 6 we use the key insights to suggest a pragmatic approach to attribution 
in market development programmes.
Attributing observed changes at market systems level to interventions is arguably 
challenging. Before we tackle this challenge, we need to clarify some concepts. Firstly, 
what do we mean by “attribution” and the related concept of “contribution”? Secondly, 
what do we want to attribute to what?
2.1 Attribution or contribution?
The OECD Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management defines 
attribution as:
“The ascription of a causal link between observed (or expected to be observed) changes and a 
specific intervention. … Attribution refers to that which is to be credited for the observed changes 
or results achieved. It represents the extent to which observed development effects can be 
attributed to a specific intervention ...”  (OECD, 2010:17).
Hence attribution only refers to the extent to which observed changes are caused by an 
intervention. This implies that the overall change might be larger than the portion of that change 
caused by the intervention. 
This definition seems to be clear enough. Yet some authors suggest using the term “contribution” 
rather than attribution. Their reason for doing this is to help them describe the effects of 
interventions in complex systems, where there are multiple other potential or actual causal 
factors. Ruffer and Wach (2013), for example, describe interventions in market systems as 
operating “as part of a wider system where, in nearly all cases, they interact in some way with 
other public and private activities to achieve their intended results. Interventions aim to catalyse 
change, inducing spill-over effects to indirectly scale up change. Most interventions can therefore 
be seen as a “contributory” cause – i.e. the intervention is a vital part of a “package” of causal 
factors that are together sufficient to produce the intended effect.” (Ruffer & Wach, 2013:17).
This distinction between attribution and contribution leads to some confusion. When asked about 
their own definitions, the key informants’ answers varied greatly. Some interviewees understood 
attribution as only “sole attribution”. For this group, attribution means that an intervention causes 
the whole effect. Others define attribution as the process by which the proportion of a change 
that an intervention caused is isolated and quantified. For this second group, both attribution and 
contribution signify that the intervention is one of a group of factors contributing to a change, the 
difference between the two being that attribution quantifies the part played by the intervention, 
whereas causality does not. The confusion in the definitions even led one person to talk about 
“attributable contribution”!
A few interviewees criticised the distinction between attribution and contribution altogether. They 
said that no one measuring attribution in complex systems can claim sole responsibility for a 
change. One key informant raised an interesting point: If we think of human beings and all the 
entwined factors that influence us, then it does not make sense to talk about attributing a change 
to one sole cause. The point she made was that there is no technical difference between the two 
terms, only a semantic one. 
Some interviewees said that the distinction can become an “excuse” for lazy measurement 
practices. They shared experience of programmes claiming that measuring attribution is too 
difficult, and therefore assess contribution instead. Programmes then use methods lacking in 
rigor (or no methods at all), even where better-fit methods are available. 
2. Framing attribution
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One of the key informants made another suggestion: We should retire this distinction altogether. 
Instead, he suggested differentiating between sufficient and necessary causes.2
So what definition are we going to use? In this paper, for reasons of simplicity and clarity, we 
use the original definition of attribution by the OECD: Attribution is the establishment of a causal 
link between (parts of) an observed change and a specific intervention. Whether we can quantify 
this link depends on the chosen view of causality (more on this in section 3).
2.2 Attribution on different levels
The generalised Theory of Change3 for a market systems approach shown in Figure 1 illus-
trates the intended changes, represented as three “results levels”: (1) market systems change, 
(2) change in pro-poor growth or improved access to basic services, and (3) poverty reduction. 
At each results level, we find a different operating context and an increasing number of influ-
ences external to the programme that contribute to any observed change. Therefore, different 
approaches and methods are required to measure and attribute change to interventions on 
these different levels. For example, different approaches are needed to attribute a change in 
market systems dynamics to a programme’s intervention(s) or to attribute a change in household 
income or enterprise performance to a change in market system dynamics.
Figure 1: Generalised Theory of Change for programmes using a market systems approach with 
attribution questions 
POVERTY REDUCTION 
PRO-POOR GROWTH 
OR IMPROVED ACCESS 
TO BASIC SERVICES
MARKET SYSTEM CHANGE
INTERVENTION
How can 
changes in the 
market system 
be attributed to 
interventions?
How can changes in 
pro-poor growth or 
access to basic services 
be attributed to 
interventions?
How can changes 
in poverty levels 
be attributed to 
interventions?
We will return to this discussion in Section 6 after looking at how attribution is done in practice 
and the challenges faced (Section 3) and then establishing a technical understanding of  
causality (Section 4). 
2  For an explanation of the terms “necessary” and “sufficient” see Section 4.2.
3  For an introduction to Theories of Change on market systems development programmes see BEAM Guidance
Source: The Springfield Centre (2014), questions added by authors
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Now that we have a better definition of attribution, we can explore the experiences 
and challenges of conceptualising and measuring attribution in practice, reported by 
practitioners. 
This section summarises the insights gained from interviewing key informants supplemented 
by insights from practitioner oriented literature. The three key themes that emerged from both 
interviews and literature are: 
• conflicting world views over to what extent attribution is possible for programmes using a market 
systems approach (Section 3.1)
• three common approaches for measuring attribution (Section 3.2) and political and practical
• constraints to measuring attribution (Section 3.3). 
3.1 Conflicting world views and the middle ground
Varying views emerged from the key informant interviews over whether it is at all possible to 
attribute observed changes resulting from interventions in market systems.
On one end of the spectrum, interviewed practitioners commented that demonstrating causality 
in complex systems is near-on impossible. This is in line with Snowden (2013) who asserts that: 
“you can’t show actual attribution because it’s dependent on other things that are going on at the 
same time.” This position is also echoed in the impact evaluation literature. Befani and Mayne 
(2014) argue for “shifting the focus of impact evaluation from “assessing impact” to “assessing 
confidence” (about impact).”
In opposition to this view, some interviewed practitioners are of the opinion that it is possible to 
attribute complex changes to interventions using a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods: a view that is also shared in the literature (White & Phillips, 2012; White, 2009b). 
One key informant claimed that the complexity argument is a “red herring”. With experimental 
methods,4 the statistical tools used can control for complexity. Furthermore, most experimental 
methods do not need to go into the “why” an intervention worked to tell whether a programme 
has made a change or not. Therefore, the informant claimed, the fact that causal relationships 
within complex systems cannot be predicted is irrelevant. 
This debate, however, is not a dichotomy: there is a wide range of views between these two 
ends of the spectrum. The position of most of the key informants – the middle ground – was 
that programmes should be pragmatic in choosing their attribution methods to build up a 
realistic picture of what happened. There is a broad acceptance that due to the complexity of 
the systems that programmes work with, and the difficulty of assessing causality in complex 
systems, programmes cannot measure attribution with complete precision.
How then are programmes to know how much precision is “good enough”? A few interviewees 
suggested that guidelines should be developed on what is not good enough. This could steer 
programmes when developing their attribution strategies. Others cited existing guidance, in 
particular Posthumus and Wanitphon (2015). These authors however, favour counterfactual 
methods and do not suggest alternatives that could provide the same level of rigour. There are 
as we will introduce below, other approaches to attribution that might be a better fit for complex 
contexts. However, there is a lack of guidance for a pragmatic use of these methods.
This middle ground is characterised by three prominent features that were repeatedly mentioned 
by the interviewees: 
1. Practitioners see it as important to use a combination of methods to measure 
attribution. The reason for this is to use complementary strengths to combat the limitations 
of any single method. 
4  For an explanation of experimental and quasi experimental designs see http://bit.ly/2mbaO1K
3. Attribution in practice
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2. Practitioners emphasise participatory methods. Any attribution measurement should 
involve participation from those within the system, in both the design of measurement  
frameworks and the analysis of data. Participatory methods also support capturing 
unintended changes.  
3. Practitioners think we should be more explicit in discussing the multitude of causal factors 
influencing the change which the programme aspires to, including a recognition that there are 
causal factors we do not know about. This allows a more comprehensive understanding of how 
the changes take place and what the realistic role of an intervention was. 
3.2 Three common approaches for measuring attribution in practice
The three types of approaches on measuring attribution used by interviewed practitioners and 
mentioned in the literature are: (1) comparative approaches, (2) prospective approaches, and (3) 
retrospective approaches. Examples and common tools used for each approach are provided 
later in the paper.  
Comparative approaches
Comparative approaches take two or more cases that are very similar except for a few key 
characteristics and compares them. The cases generally differ over whether an intervention 
occurred or not, though they could also differ in the type or intensity of an intervention. The aim 
of the comparison is to observe what effects are visible and how they are similar or different, or 
what causal pathways can be discerned in each case.
The most prominent strategy used by practitioners for establishing attribution through 
comparison is the use of methods based on counterfactuals like experimental and quasi-
experimental methods. Experimental and quasi-experimental methods are useful in that they 
allow one to understand what would have happened without an intervention. Furthermore, they 
are respected by many donors as being rigorous methodologies. They are, therefore, valuable 
for proving results and satisfying the demand for accountability.
Some of the key informants we interviewed and also parts of the literature, critique the use of 
experimental methods for this very reason: one interviewee argued that many experimental 
designs, such as randomised controlled trials (RCT)5, do not allow programmes to assess 
why their interventions are creating the changes they are. This knowledge is crucial to improve 
and learn – for the programme itself, and for other programmes looking to try similar programme 
or intervention designs. This critique is also widely reflected in the evaluation literature. Stern et 
al. (2012) make the point that the “why” is not only important for learning, but also for attribution 
itself: “Counterfactuals associate a single cause with a given effect without providing information 
on what happens in-between: how the effect is produced. This information can be important for 
attribution purposes because knowing only the beginning and the end of the causal process 
might not be sufficiently fine-grained in some situations” (Stern et al., 2012:7).
While not explicitly mentioned by interviewed practitioners, Stern et al. (2012) stress that there 
are comparative approaches that do not depend on counterfactuals. For example, configurational 
methods use different cases and compare their similarities and differences, and qualitative 
comparisons between different cases are also used to understand aspects of attribution.
Prospective approaches
Practitioners interviewed for this paper also reported using prospective approaches for establishing 
causality. Prospective approaches start off by developing a theory of how an intervention aims 
to achieve a change. This often takes the form of logic models (results chains6, logframes) or 
Theories of Change. Once the intervention has started, changes at each step of the causal chain 
are validated to show the plausibility of the causal links between each step7. 
5  For more details on this method see: http://bit.ly/2moNWYE
6  For guidance on using results chains see the BEAM Guidance on Monitoring
7  This logic is codified in a widely applied method called Contribution Analysis, developed by Mayne (2008).
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Interviewees reported that the value of prospective approaches is that they help programmes to 
think through what changes they expect to see. This is also useful for intervention design and 
management. Further, these approaches can be used to determine whether an intervention is 
on the wrong track, or if a change is not due to an intervention, by flagging which links within a 
causal chain have or have not been realised. 
The key criticism of prospective approaches from interviewed practitioners was that they do not 
capture unexpected changes. Interventions in complex systems generally lead to unexpected 
effects, so this is a crucial omission. For this reason, practitioners suggested that prospective 
approaches should be paired with retrospective approaches that can capture these effects (see 
below). Prospective approaches, particularly if they apply a linear causal logic, are also criticised 
for not being equipped to deal with the emergent8 nature of causality in complex systems. They 
are furthermore criticised because they give the impression that change is predictable.
In reaction to this criticism, the key informants argued that it is not the prospective tools that are 
problematic, but rather the way in which programmes use them. Theories should not be fixed 
blueprints, but should rather be continuously evaluated and adjusted using an iterative and 
adaptive approach.
Retrospective approaches and assessment of external causes
Retrospective attribution approaches look at changes that have occurred and trace back their 
causal factors to identify which factors contributed to the change. An example of a tool used by 
interviewees that uses retrospective logic is outcome harvesting9. When using this tool one starts 
by scanning the market system for the intended or unintended consequences of an intervention. 
Then one attempts to verify whether these changes were caused by a programme intervention. 
The practitioners interviewed highlighted the value of retrospective approaches in capturing 
external factors that contribute to the changes being measured. This is critical for programmes 
given the multiplicity of causal influences in the complex market systems they operate in. 
Interviewees, however, reflected that retrospective approaches are often primarily qualitative. 
They are also susceptible to bias from overconfidence10, and it can be very difficult to link 
changes back to the intervention. Where these approaches are quantitative, they often involve 
very large surveys and can be difficult and expensive to apply. 
 
3.3 Political and practical constraints to measuring attribution
Political economy
“There is a gap between what [some practitioners] think is true – that 
attribution is fanciful – and what the politicians and donors want to hear.”11
The political economy surrounding market systems approaches – and development in general 
– has a large effect on how programmes tackle the challenges of measuring attribution. The 
opinion of one practitioner interviewed was that the “hangover” from previous direct delivery  
approaches means that there is both a lack of understanding of how causality works in a market 
system as well as unrealistic expectations of how attribution should be approached.
A recurrent theme from interviewed practitioners was how the challenges of measuring 
attribution are directly influenced by donors’ accountability requirements. It was pointed out 
that accepted industry  standards on measuring attribution are influenced by the expectations 
of those to whom programmes report, whether they be government donors, philanthropists or 
taxpayers. One interviewee commented that it would be very difficult to go to the US Congress 
and explain to them that it is not possible to measure attribution in some contexts.
  8 For an explanation of emergence, see Appendix 2: Complexity and emergence
  9 For more details on outcome harvesting see: http://bit.ly/2ludeqZ
10 For details on this bias see: http://bit.ly/2mblcqt 
11 Key informant interviewed for this paper
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As he put it: “Their eyes would just glaze over.” Some interviewed practitioners see this 
restriction as a constraint to developing best practice methods for measuring systemic change. 
They view it as restricting movement away from methods that are currently deemed to be 
rigorous in a generic sense – mainly quantitative methods using counterfactuals – towards new 
methods that better fit market development programmes and their contexts, while still being 
technically rigorous. 
An additional point raised was how the resource restrictions on programmes’ monitoring and 
evaluating components constrain adequate attribution measurement. One key informant 
complained that some donors, “just want numbers, but do not want to spend the money.” 
Interviewees raised the same concerns with regard to implementing agencies. One informant 
commented that, “actually, just as much resistance to rigorous attribution methodologies comes 
from implementers, who do not want to spend the resources and prefer light touch approaches.” He 
related this to the perverse incentives created by contracting structures such as payment-by-results 
contracts, which can disincentivise investments in progressively developing attribution strategies. 
Another key informant, however, made the point that it is irresponsible to claim that market systems 
are too complex to measure attribution and that programmes should be designed in a way that the 
effects can be measured using counterfactual methods. He argued that it should not be a hard sell to 
convince donors to give programmes the necessary resources to rigorously test interventions. 
A multitude of causal factors
Many factors influence the outcomes which programmes using market systems approaches 
are interested in, such as behavioural changes or changes in income and employment. With 
the increase in causal distance, i.e. the number of causal steps from an intervention to the 
observed effect, and scale of an anticipated outcome, the multiplicity of other factors influencing 
that outcome also increases. At the same time, the relative influence of the intervention on the 
outcome decreases. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Causality between interventions and objectives and external influences
POVERTY REDUCTION 
PRO-POOR GROWTH 
OR IMPROVED ACCESS 
TO BASIC SERVICES
MARKET SYSTEM CHANGE
INTERVENTION
Influence of 
intervention
Influence of 
external 
factors
HIGH
HIGHLOW
LOW
Source: Adapted from Ruffer and Wach (2013), The Springfield Centre (2014)
beamexchange.org 11 Causality and attribution 
Both the academic literature and interviewed practitioners highlight causal density, i.e. the high 
number of other factors that have a causal influence on an outcome, as one of the core reasons 
for the challenges faced in establishing causality. This is particularly true for interventions that 
aim at catalysing wider system change. One key informant put it this way: “Life is not a lab.” 
Measuring changes in a market does not involve a finite number of causes that we can control.  
Inability to predict causal chains
A common view revealed from the interviews was that causal chains in complex contexts are 
unpredictable. One practitioner said that we are incapable of either knowing or understanding 
all the causal factors in a market system. Even having complete knowledge of all the factors 
influencing an outcome would not be enough to build a clear causal chain. This is because 
causality in complex systems is emergent and therefore change does not occur along a chain of 
causally connected events (see Appendix 2: Complexity and emergence). 
Consequently, the causal models that are developed at the beginning of a programme hardly 
ever match reality. Interviewees explained that this means that not all measurement can be 
planned in advance. This makes establishing control groups difficult (see below). Furthermore, 
results chains and Theories of Change can often over-state causal links between interventions 
and anticipated changes because they do not show other influences besides the programme 
interventions. We do not have the knowledge to predict all the other causal factors that 
contribute to the change.
One key informant takes a pragmatic view: he argues that it is less the tools (results chains 
and Theories of Change) that are the problem, but more how they are used. If used well, a 
results chain helps to provide a “best guess” prediction of anticipated changes that is not set in 
stone, but is continuously revised. If used this way, these models still have management and 
measurement value.
Constructing control groups
In efforts to apply counterfactual approaches to measuring attribution, many interviewed 
practitioners reported they find the construction of control groups in market systems challenging. 
Challenges include contamination, self-selection bias, changes in programme strategies that can 
make group set-ups useless, and the time frames of market system changes. The fact that many 
practitioners see this challenge as central in establishing attribution shows that counterfactual 
methods play a central role in their practice.
Proponents of counterfactual designs resist these positions. One key informant argued that there 
are statistical methods to overcome some of these challenges. Where there are no mechanisms 
to limit access to the treatment he suggests using methods such as encouragement designs12 
to prompt random differential take-up. He also suggests using cluster analysis13 to overcome 
self-selection bias14 and multiplicity of causal factors. Where effects are non-linear, for example 
because of diminishing returns or threshold effects, he suggests using statistical methods to 
compensate for the challenges.
 
12  For information on and an application of encouragement designs see Bradlow (1998) 
13  For information on cluster analysis see: http://bit.ly/2lOGae7
14  For an explanation of self-selection bias see: http://bit.ly/2mbyu6r
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In Section 2 we defined what we mean by attribution. Attribution depends on establishing 
causality, so how we understand causality determines how we approach attribution. In 
this section, we explore three different theories of causality from the evaluation literature. 
Pawson (2007)15 differentiates between three types of causal explanation:
•	 Successionist causality: Causality as statistical regularity, independent variables 
affecting dependent variables.
•	 Configurational causality: Causality as a combination of factors working together in a 
cumulative way.
•	 Generative causality: Causality as part of the whole system that is irreducible to the 
parts.
We will look at each of these in turn.
4.1 Successionist causality
In a successionist perspective of causality, variables do the explanatory work. Each variable 
describes a single cause that has a specific effect. The effect that is observed or intended is 
defined as the “dependent variable” (Y). The research is about finding “independent variables” 
(X) that have an effect on the dependent variable. Multiple independent variables (X1, X2, X3, …) 
can have independent contributions to an effect. 
There are two ways to infer causality in successionist models. Causality is inferred either by: 
1. How regularly cause and effect occur together, holding all other factors constant 
(correlational logic), or 
2. The difference between two events, where everything but the cause is the same 
(counterfactual logic) (Befani, 2012). 
In successionist models it is implied that more of the independent variable automatically leads 
to more of the dependent variable. However, as White (2009a) points out, this relationship does 
not have to be linear. Indeed, statistical methods can cope with various relationships between 
the independent and dependent variables. This includes diminishing returns, threshold effects as 
well as multi-variate causality.
In the real world, multiple factors usually influence one effect. To isolate the specific effect of 
one variable on another, researchers use either experimental or quasi-experimental designs or 
statistical means (causal modelling).
Researchers who use successionist approaches develop hypotheses on how variables could 
be connected. They then collect data using appropriate measurement tools and field work 
techniques to prove or disprove the hypotheses. 
Experimental methods require ex-ante designs while quasi-experimental methods and 
15  Quoted with kind permission of the author.
4. Causality in the evaluation literature
Successionists locate and identify vital causal agents as “variables” or 
“treatments”. Research seeks to observe the association between such var-
iables by means of surveys or experimental trials. Explanation is a matter 
of distinguishing between associations that are real or direct (as opposed to 
spurious and indirect) and of providing an estimate of the size and signifi-
cance of the observed causal influence(s). (Pawson, 2007:1)
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statistical modeling can be applied ex-post.16 Data quality is essential and depends on the 
appropriateness of measurement tools and field work. 
4.2 Configurational causality
Instead of variables, the basic unit of research in configurational analysis is the condition. 
Combinations, or so-called configurations, of conditions have causal power. Like variables, conditions 
are identifiable, observable and measurable. Yet they interact with each other and with the context, 
rather than having their own independent causal power as in the case of successionist variables.
Befani (2012:11) differentiates between two different types of condition: “ground-preparing 
causes” that build a background against which “immediate causes” can be effective. Neither the 
ground-preparing causes nor the immediate causes are effective without the other. Befani uses 
the example of combustible fumes as ground-preparing causes and the lighting of a cigarette 
as an immediate cause: only when both are present would the effect of a fire occur. In technical 
language, both conditions are necessary, but on their own they are not sufficient causes. Hence 
configurationist research is about finding the specific combination of conditions that are jointly 
sufficient to cause an effect.
To make a causal claim, the cause needs to satisfy various conditions of necessity and 
sufficiency, in particular (Befani, 2016:13):
•	 whether an intervention, or other factors like for example specific contextual or historical 
conditions, are required to achieve a certain effect or if the effect can be achieved without 
them; and
•	 whether the intervention is good enough by itself to produce the outcome or needs other 
factors and components.
Configurationist research is based on identifying cases that are equivalent but not identical and 
observing the similarities and differences between their conditions. The goal of the analysis is to 
figure out which combination of conditions has causal powers over the outcome that is observed 
in all cases. 
 
4.3 Generative causality
16  For an explanation of ex-ante and ex-post designs see page 20 of http://bit.ly/2luA5m9
Configurationists begin with a number of “cases” of a particular family of so-
cial phenomenon [sic], which have some similarities and some differences. 
They locate causal powers in the “combination” of attributes of these cases, 
with a particular grouping of attributes leading to one outcome and a further 
grouping linked to another. The goal of research is to unravel the key config-
urational clusters of properties underpinning the cases and which thus are 
able to explain variations in outcomes across the family. (Pawson, 2007:1)
Generativists, too, begin with measurable patterns and uniformities. It is 
assumed that these are brought about by the action of some underlying 
“mechanism.” Mechanisms are not variables or attributes and thus not 
always directly measurable. They are processes describing the human 
actions that have led to the uniformity. Because they depend on this choice 
making capacity of individuals and groups, the emergence of social uni-
formities is always highly conditional. Causal explanation is thus a matter of 
producing theories of the mechanisms that explain both the presence and 
absence of the “uniformity.” (Pawson, 2007:1)
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A generative approach to causality does not rely on identifying one variable or a set of 
conditions. It recognises that causal powers can be emergent and may not be reducible to a 
single cause or even a combination of causes. Instead, it tries to describe the overall association 
of three things; a specific context (C), a specific mechanism (M) and an observed outcome 
pattern (O) in that context.
Causal explanations in generative approaches take the form of propositions of what mechanisms 
(M) in what contexts (C) lead to what outcome patterns (O). These “CMO propositions” are first 
hypothesised and then empirically tested and revised in an iterative way to reflect observations. To 
revise and fine tune CMO propositions, evaluators use empirical observations, both quantitative 
and qualitative. These can include comparisons to strengthen a hypothesised proposition. 
Contexts (C): Contexts are the institutional, organisational and social conditions. There are usually 
multiple mechanisms present in a context. Mechanisms often need to be triggered by an event 
or an intervention. This means that in any system, some mechanisms are “active” (the ones that 
have been triggered), others are only potential (the ones that are yet to be triggered). Multiple 
mechanisms can operate at the same time, and even compete, leading to combined effects.
Mechanisms (M): In social systems, mechanisms are constituted by the choices people make, 
individually and collectively. These choices depend on what is possible, what resources are 
available to implement them, and what decision-making mechanisms are in place if choices are 
contested. This implies that mechanisms are often not visible, yet they can be investigated. 
Choices, however, are always implemented in a certain context. This context strongly influences 
the shape of the outcome patterns. The form of the outcome pattern is therefore different to each 
combination of a specific mechanism and a specific context.  
In contrast to successionist logic, proponents of generative methods assert that, “what causes 
something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times we observe it happening” 
(Pawson, 2007:14). Rather than searching for regularities and repeat occurrences of variables, 
generative approaches look for associations of context, mechanism and outcome in each case.
4.4 Comparison of the three types of causal explanation
Table 1 brings these three theoretical views on causality together. It compares philosophical and 
theoretical underpinnings, typical causal questions the approach is best-fit to answer, overall 
approach to establishing causality, extent to which the causal mechanism is described by the 
approach, and typical methods used to determine attribution. 
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Table 1: Overview of approaches to causality and attribution. 
Successionist Configurational Generative
Theoretical 
perspective on 
causality
Theoretical perspective: 
Association between single 
cause and single effect
Theoretical perspective: 
Association between 
configurations of conditions and 
effects
Theoretical perspective: 
Description of causal 
mechanism
Causal 
questions
To what extent did the 
intervention make a difference? 
Did the intervention cause the 
effect? How much is the net 
effect of the intervention?
Did the intervention make a 
difference and through which 
patterns? 
What configurations of factors 
are necessary and/or sufficient 
to cause the effect?
How did the intervention 
make a difference?  
How was the effect 
produced? How did it come 
about?
Approach 
to establish 
causality
Correlational: establishing 
the frequency of associations 
between an intervention and 
an outcome, holding all other 
factors constant 
Counterfactual: establishing 
the difference between the 
case and another case where 
all other factors except the 
intervention were the same 
Examining which conditions 
combine and interact to 
produce an outcome, which 
also depends on the context 
Investigating the different 
mechanisms at play in a 
particular context which 
produce an outcome 
Description 
of causal 
mechanism
None Only basic ingredients are 
described: conditions, their 
combinations and disjunctions
In-depth
Methods for 
determining 
attribution
Statistical approaches, 
experiments, quasi-
experiments
Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) 
Decision tree learning
Realist approaches
Process tracing
Contribution analysis
Outcome harvesting
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation, drawing among others from Schatz and Welle (2016) and Befani and 
Mayne (2014)
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Through key informant interviews, we explored the experiences and challenges of measuring 
attribution in practice, which gave us some insight into how the different concepts are 
applied and what real world constraints practitioners face. The literature review provided an 
understanding of different views on causality and attribution. This section reflects on these 
two perspectives together, and looks at implications for future practice.
The successionist paradigm still strongly influences the thinking on attribution in monitoring 
and evaluation as can be seen from the key informant interviews summarised in Section 3. 
Counterfactual methods are, implicitly or explicitly, seen as the ‘gold standard’ to establishing 
attribution. Practitioners said they experience continuous pressure to use successionist causality 
and the related counterfactual models, particularly experimental methods. Establishing control 
groups is generally required to apply successionist approaches to measuring attribution.  
However many interviewed practitioners expressed concern that these methods do not fit the 
realities of the market systems they work with. This view is also reflected in recent reviews of 
evaluation methods for market systems approaches (Fowler & Dunn, 2014; Ruffer & Wach, 
2013), as well as in discussions in the evaluation community (Befani et al., 2015; Befani et al., 
2014; Stern et al., 2012). The evaluation scholars also make it clear that there are alternatives to 
successionist methods that can achieve the same level of rigour.
While there is pressure to use successionist methods for attribution, interviewed practitioners 
continue to explore approaches to both monitoring and evaluation based on a generative 
understanding of causality. This has, for example, led to making theory-based approaches17 
using Theories of Change, the norm in monitoring and evaluation in market systems 
development. Theories of Change are an inherently generative tool as they try to explain the 
“how” of the change process in a step-by-step manner (Pawson, 2007). 
Hence the case for moving beyond a purely successionist approach to attribution, both in theory 
and practice, has clearly been made, though has not as-yet been explicitly stated in guidance 
and practice.
The different approaches applied to measuring causality, however, are sometimes seen 
as representing fundamentally different world views, which are difficult to reconcile. The 
successionist and the generative paradigms often view the other as unnecessary, or of very 
limited use. The configurational approach somehow occupies a position in-between. It is used to 
complement a successionist view and make it more adaptive to complexity, or it is used to make 
generative accounts more quantitative and amenable to statistical analysis. 
Essentially, there is no ultimate correct answer to the question of what the best way is to attribute 
cause and effect. Too much depends on the world view that is adopted by the people involved, 
particularly those with the power to mandate certain approaches.
It is not the aim of this paper to revisit the arguments of both sides and take a stance on either. 
Rather, we take a pragmatic approach that will lead us to useful and practicable advice for 
practitioners who do not have the capacities, resources, or indeed, the liberty to be dogmatic 
about the adopted approach.
From that pragmatic point of view, we can make three observations:
•	 A generative approach is better able to explain how the causal mechanisms work 
(the “why it worked” question). 
 
 
17  More information can be found on these approaches at: http://bit.ly/2mbpiP5
5. Discussion
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•	 A successionist approach is better at achieving a higher level of confidence in 
showing co-occurrence of cause and effect, and the size of the net effect (the “if 
and to what extend it worked” question). Although, the validity obviously depends on the 
ability of the researchers to establish the necessary conditions for the methods to work 
properly. 
•	 Perfect attribution in complex contexts is difficult (if not impossible). Referring 
to Befani et al. (2014), we suggest that we need to shift from “assessing attribution” to 
“assessing confidence about attribution” (or contribution if one prefers that term). Or, to 
use the words of some of the key informants: “we should not let the perfect be the enemy 
of the good.”
6.  A pragmatic approach to attribution in market systems: 
recomendations
Building on the discussion above, this section provides a typology of attribution 
strategies adapted to different contexts and using different perspectives. This typology 
aims to help practitioners to make a pragmatic choice of attribution strategies for their 
various interventions and achieve a reasonable degree of credibility and validity in their 
monitoring and evaluation practice.
6.1 A typology of attribution methods
The first dimension of the suggested typology reflects the three dominant ways of understanding 
causality; successionist, configurational, and generative causality. At the risk of over-simplification, 
we can say that these world views reveal a spectrum rather than a dichotomy. On one side, cause-
and-effect relationships are ordered and each cause and its specific effect can be isolated and 
quantified. On the other side, causal influence occurs at various emergent levels inside the system. 
To differentiate from the ordered side, we will call this side complex18 (Figure 3).
Figure 3: The spectrum from ordered to complex extends the different world views on causality
The successionist view of the world is located on the ordered side. In ordered systems, the 
whole equals the sum of the parts. All causal powers of individual variables can be added up to 
show the whole causal effect. In contrast, the generative view sees the world as complex, with 
change being emergent and unpredictable. In an emergent system, the whole is greater than 
the sum of the parts. Interactions between variables can lead to results that are greater than the 
sum of the causal powers of the individual variables. The configurational view sits somewhere 
in-between, requiring enough order to compare various configurations of conditions, while also 
considering that there is interaction between conditions. 
In reality, market systems development programmes and their interventions can be situated across 
the spectrum. Not everything is complex, even in a market system. Some aspects are ordered 
and predictable for example procedures for storing produce in shared storage facilities. Others are 
unpredictable and emergent, such as behaviours of market players. 
18  There are many definitions of complex. We use this term as it is easily recognised, and understand complex as a 
situation where cause-and-effect relationships are emergent and the system is dynamic and evolving. Kurtz and 
Snowden (2003) also use the term ‘emergent order’ for the second side.
COMPLEX ORDERED
Generative 
causality 
Configurational 
causality 
Successionist 
causality
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It is therefore necessary for practitioners to understand where on the spectrum their interventions 
are situated, and what method can be used to answer the relevant causal questions. A particular 
programme can, therefore, be required to consider causality from a range of perspectives, 
depending on the part of the programme being considered.
The second dimension of the typology is based on the different approaches to attribution 
described in Section 3.2. Monitoring and evaluation frameworks that can establish credible 
attribution claims should comprise aspects of the following four perspectives:
•	 A prospective perspective that looks forward and describes what an intervention intends 
to achieve and how. Along the way, theories need to be updated based on new insights 
and evidence.
•	 A retrospective perspective that is based on observed changes and attempts to 
reconcile these with the interventions as well as other influencing factors.
•	 A comparative perspective of cases that are similar enough to give insights into the size 
of the effect and the functioning of the causal mechanism, ideally both. 
•	 An integrative perspective that brings different perspectives together and adds 
alternative causes that were observed or assumed to have potentially influenced/
contributed to the outcome and when they occurred in relation to the programme 
interventions.
In Table 2 we map out these four elements and the context they are most suitable for. This 
table is intended to help practitioners chose attribution strategies that are adapted to their 
interventions. It provides guidance on selecting methods which match the programme’s context. 
It can also be used as a basis to discuss such strategies with donors. 
Table 2: Typology of attribution approaches along the two dimensions of ordered-complex and the 
four perspectives
Complex --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ordered
Generative Configurational Successionist
When does it 
work?
•	 Dynamic contexts
•	 High number of interacting 
causal factors (“high causal 
density”)
•	 Long causal chains linking 
interventions with intended 
outcomes and impacts
•	 Causal models need to be 
adaptive and change over 
time
•	 Emergence and disposition-
ality (see appendices 1 and 
2) do not allow for linear 
causal chains
•	 Low certainty about working 
solutions and low levels of 
agreement among stake-
holders
•	 Repeated occurrences of 
a factor or combination of 
factors do not always create 
the same effect
•	 Fairly stable contexts
•	 Causal influences not 
independently sufficient
•	 Causal links between 
specific groupings of 
causal agents and antici-
pated effects
•	 At least 3-5 reasonably 
similar cases to be com-
pared
•	 Highly ordered contexts 
with stable cause-effect 
relations 
•	 Direct causal relation or 
reasonably short and 
non-controversial causal 
chain
•	 Interventions focused on 
changing one or a few 
discrete aspects that can 
be measured
•	 Control group set up or 
alternative counterfactual 
feasible 
•	 There may be multiple 
causal influences, but they 
are all independent of one 
another and can be con-
trolled for
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Example
Alliances Lesser Caucuses 
Programme (ALCP) applica-
tion of Outcome Harvesting to 
identify unintended outcomes 
of ALCP’s dairy interventions
Use of a configurational 
analysis as part of the Par-
ticipatory Impact Assess-
ment & Learning Approach 
(PIALA) for evaluating 
commodity chain develop-
ment in Ghana
BIF RCT measuring how 
dehumanisation and indus-
trial engineering skills cause 
changes in garment factory 
profits and employee welfare
Prospective
Use of Theory of Change, 
causal mechanisms or CMO 
propositions (see Section 
4.3) to describe and sub-
sequently refine potential 
mechanisms that could explain 
the change
Use of hypotheses to collect 
conditions to compare
Use of hypotheses about 
causal relations to establish 
relevant influences and vari-
ables to test or control for
Retrospective
Iterative approach to updating 
the theory based on data col-
lection and analysis based on 
Bayesian probability logic 
(see Appendix 3)
Iterative approach of updating 
the theory based on data col-
lection and analysis; refining, 
adding or taking away condi-
tions and cases, depending 
on new insights that emerge 
during the analysis
Use of quasi-experimental 
methods applying different 
statistical mechanisms like 
propensity score match-
ing to establish comparison 
groups ex-post
Comparison
Pragmatic use of comparison 
data where available and use-
ful to add to the understanding 
of the causal mechanisms
Comparison between multi-
ple selected cases, compar-
ing different combinations of 
conditions
Different ways of construct-
ing a counterfactual. Most 
common is the comparison 
between a treatment group 
and a control group in experi-
mental and quasi-experimen-
tal approaches
Alternative causes
Generative enquiries generate 
rich narratives of mechanisms 
and contextual factors that 
work together to create a spe-
cific outcome, which includes 
possible alternative causes
Rejecting alternative causes 
by showing that they are not 
necessarily part of any joint-
ly sufficient set of conditions
Rejecting alternative causes 
by statistically controlling for 
their influence
The choice of which of these elements should be applied in measuring attribution depends on 
a number of factors relating to the programme (and components within a programme) being 
considered. These include:
•	 type of context their interventions are implemented in
•	 monitoring or evaluation questions that need to be answered
•	 human and financial resources that are available for monitoring or evaluation activities 
and staffing
•	 capacity of the staff that will implement the activities
•	 approaches and methods that are appropriate to answer these questions in the given 
context with the given resources
•	 time available before reporting on results is required
6.2 Applying the typology to market systems development
In this section, we discuss how the typology discussed above could be applied in market 
systems approaches. We base this section on the programme examples given in Table 2. 
Ordered contexts
In ordered contexts, causal chains are relatively short and the context is stable enough 
so the causal relations are likely to remain unchanged over the duration of the intervention. 
An example of a short causal chain is given in Figure 4. In market systems approaches this is 
usually only the case when direct effects of interventions are observed on the lowest level of a 
programme’s Theory of Change, even before expecting market systems change to occur.
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Figure 4: An example of ordered cause and effect relations
Advice on 
working 
conditions
Improved 
working 
conditions
Improved 
productivity
In these situations, a successionist approach can prove to be effective. The attribution strategy 
could be developed as follows:
Prospective: A results chain is developed as shown in Figure 4. Assumptions are added as to 
why these causal links are believed to be valid. For example, it can be assumed that businesses 
that receive direct advice on working conditions will implement this advice, since they 
understand that this could improve their revenues. A way to measure whether the hypothesised 
results chain holds true is to collect quantitative data from the companies on productivity. 
Qualitative data could comprise information about company regulations on working conditions 
and the perspective of the company’s staff on what has changed in their working reality. The 
attribution claim is supported if this data collection shows that the working conditions and the 
productivity in those companies that were given advice had improved. 
Retrospective: A retrospective approach would involve scanning the market for companies that 
seem to perform better than others and assess why. If the scan shows that many of the companies 
that perform better have better working conditions, this supports the causal claim between working 
conditions and improved productivity. If these companies are the ones that received advice from 
the programme, this supports the attribution claim by the programme. If the number of companies 
is high enough, the collected data can be collected in a quasi-experimental way by retrospectively 
assigning companies to a treatment and a comparison group.
Comparative: Comparison can be made between different companies. In this situation, this 
can be done by using a quasi-experimental or experimental method, depending on the way 
the intervention is designed. If the companies that receive the treatment are chosen by the 
programme, an experimental method may be possible. If they self-select into receiving the 
advice, a quasi-experimental approach works better – which is then the same approach as 
described above in the retrospective perspective.
Alternative causes: In this context, the number of alternative causes is relatively easy to 
assess. The people who make decisions about changes in the company, including working 
conditions, is small. These people can be questioned about what changes were implemented 
and where the ideas for these changes come from. If there are a sufficient number of 
companies, alternative causes can be controlled for statistically. If it is shown that the alternative 
causes did not have a significant impact, this strengthens the attribution claim.
By integrating both qualitative and quantitative elements from these different perspectives of 
causality and attribution strategy design, we can develop a rich picture of change and attribution 
that tells the story from what the situation looked like before the intervention started to the picture 
at the end. This story can include when and what was done, what changes were observed and 
why these changes are likely to have been caused by the intervention. 
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Complex contexts
In complex contexts, causal density is high and causal chains are long and intricate. In market 
systems approaches, we find this is virtually always the case when attempting to attribute change 
at the market systems change level or ‘higher level’ changes (such as growth or access to basic 
services, and poverty reduction) – to an intervention. In market systems approaches, we find this 
is virtually always the case when attempting to attribute change at the market systems change 
results level, and ‘above’ to changes in growth or access to basic services, and poverty reduction.
In these situations, a generative approach is most appropriate. The different elements of the 
attribution strategy could look as follows:
Prospective: The programme will develop a Theory of Change (ToC) and results chains. From 
the generative world view, ToCs are used in a different way to successionist approaches. ToCs do 
not comprise fixed hypotheses that are tested over the implementation period of an intervention. 
Instead, they are living documents that are used by the programme team to make sense of what 
is going on and to keep track of their growing understanding. This understanding is generated 
by continuous learning through multiple channels. These can include informal channels, such as 
day-to-day observations and conversations, or more formal channels, such as monitoring efforts 
to measure different aspects of the ToC. The measurement framework that is applied could look 
quite similar to a framework applied in a successionist model. The use of a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods is, however, more critical. The emphasis of the measurement efforts is on 
learning, and updating the understanding about the context and effects.
Retrospective: Compared to the successionist world view, the retrospective element becomes 
more important in this strategy. The reason for this is that in complex contexts a ToC cannot 
capture all aspects of a situation. The predicted causal chain is only one among many possible 
causal chains, and there are many other influencing factors at play. Appropriate measurement 
will comprise mixed methods, and some methods will most likely be used for both prospective 
and retrospective analysis, such as field observations and diaries. More formal approaches to 
retrospective assessment can be used, such as Outcome Harvesting.
Comparative: Comparison in a generative context does not have the same central role 
as it does in successionist or configurational settings. Having said that, data generated by 
counterfactual or configurational methods can of course also be used in a situation where a 
generative attribution strategy is most appropriate, to add to the overall picture. In addition to 
systematic comparisons, more qualitative comparisons can also be used, for example through 
observation of different cases.
Alternative causes: Generative enquiries generate rich narratives of mechanisms and 
contextual factors that work together to create a specific outcome. The assessment of alternative 
causes is therefore inherent in generative enquiries.
As with alternative causes, Bayesian logic is inherent in generative enquiries. Each observation 
and all additional data are continuously used to update and refine one’s understanding of a 
situation to enable it be described in as much detail as possible.
Case Study: The Business Innovation Facility (BIF) programme 
implemented a Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) in the Myanmar garments 
market to study the effect of their interventions. BIF is working with 15 garment 
factories, providing HR and productivity training to support the businesses to 
improve their practices, increase efficiency and improve their positioning for 
supplying larger buyers in the international market. The RCT seeks to identify 
exactly how training affects worker welfare and productivity, and whether there 
is strong enough evidence to prove a link between the two..
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6.3 Choosing the most appropriate methods and increasing confidence
While arguing for a pragmatic approach, we still think that there should be a minimum level of 
quality for attribution strategies. This plays out on two levels. 
Firstly, an agreement on a minimum level of quality in monitoring, evaluation and attribution work 
needs to be generally agreed for the market systems community. There are different ways of 
developing such an agreement. Two examples are the use of auditable standards or broader 
conventions. The widely used DCED Standard provides guidance on estimating attributable 
changes in monitoring and results measurement (Sen, 2016). This guidance, however, narrowly 
advocates an approach to measuring attribution that is inspired by a successionist world view. 
An alternative to a standard would be a broader convention which provides options for best-fit 
practices, such as Better Evaluation19 for the evaluation field. Better Evaluation was developed 
by a group of universities, think tanks, and an accreditation body. It is an interactive website 
combining experience in applying best-fit and learning from less suitable practice, with a case-
based approach to facilitate practitioners to decide on what is accepted as “good enough” for a 
particular programme’s operating context and design. 
Standards are very good instruments to improve general practice from a low level to an 
acceptable level. The DCED Standard is a good example for this as it has clearly improved MRM 
practice in market systems development. The challenge with standards, however, can be that 
they tend to drive the dominant world view and discount alternative approaches, and are often 
slow to adapt to new developments in our understanding. Conventions, on the other hand, are 
more flexible and respond better to emerging ideas and contested world views.  
Secondly, field practitioners need to make pragmatic choices of methods they will employ to 
attribute change to interventions of their programmes. Implementing a methodological framework 
that best-fits the demands of the context requires investment in the right resources. Programmes 
need access to staff and advisers who have a sufficiently high level of technical capacity to 
design, plan and implement measurement frameworks, analyse data and report on results. 
Additionally, not all programmes can implement the most rigorous of all methods. Programmes 
usually find that they have limited financial resources (budget) available for monitoring and 
evaluation. In addition, staff capacity is often limited as most programmes cannot hire academics 
to do rigorous research, or cannot find access to the right advice at the right time. Hence, it is 
important to understand the compromises made, and the limitations of an attribution strategy, 
while being transparent about the choices made.
19  http://betterevaluation.org/
Case Study: The Alliances Lesser Caucasus Programme (ALCP) is 
a programme using a market systems approach. ALCP’s monitoring and 
results measurement framework is built on and audited against the DCED 
Standard for Results Measurement. Its attribution strategy was initially 
based on a successionist world view on causality stipulated by the standard. 
The main attribution strategy is to validate causal links along a linear results 
chain. The programme leadership team has recognised that this approach 
was limiting. For example, it makes it difficult for the project to recognise 
unintended consequences and make a strong attribution claim for chang-
es that were not originally foreseen in its results chains. Thus, the team 
has has recently added new components to this strategy, using generative 
logic to strengthen its attribution claims. The programme has trialled Out-
come Harvesting. By employing this retrospective method, the programme 
was able to find a number of systemic changes in the region in which the 
programme is active and to link these to programme interventions. This 
information enhanced the findings from the DCED Standard-audited MRM 
system, leading to a richer picture of ALCP’s achievements.
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To reach an exact answer as to whether an intervention contributed to a change, and the size of 
the net change it created, is very resource intensive in market systems development (if it is at all 
possible). By using several different methods instead, including participatory methods, we can 
develop a rich picture of the scenario and the changes observed over time. Instead of attempting 
to prove attribution beyond any doubt, each additional measurement or observation increases 
our confidence in the attribution claim. This logic of continuously increasing the confidence in a 
causal claim is called Bayesian updating.
It is also important to keep in mind that not everything is complex, even in a market system. 
Certain aspects of market systems can be fairly ordered, for example procedures for storing 
produce in shared storage facilities. An assessment of the context and the selection of the 
relevant method needs to be made for each intervention.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to shed light on the concept of attribution and its application 
in market systems approaches. Attribution is the establishment of a causal link between an 
observed effect and a specific intervention. We looked at how attribution is done in practice and 
what challenges practitioner faced. We also looked at the evaluation literature and provided a 
theoretical perspective on causality and attribution.
Bringing the practical and theoretical perspectives together, we have found that there is a 
legitimate spectrum of views on causality, spanning from successionist to generative positions. 
Still, successionist views dominate the discussion among practitioners. Practitioners report that 
donors continue to ask for methods that are rooted in a successionist view, such as experimental 
or quasi experimental methods. However, we show in this paper that the case for moving beyond 
a purely successionist approach to attribution is strong and has been made, both in theory and 
in practice.
We developed a typology based on different views on causality and requirements of different 
contexts to support practitioners in developing their attribution strategy. When developing an 
attribution strategy, practitioners need to be aware that perfect attribution in complex contexts is 
very difficult, if not impossible. We therefore advocate for a pragmatic approach of “best-fit” over 
“best practice”. Selecting attribution strategies in any context depends on available resources 
for monitoring and evaluation as well as the technical capacity of the staff. To still achieve a high 
level of confidence in results and attribution claims, it is important to be transparent about the 
logic and decisions that led to the development of an attribution strategy. Both standards and 
broader conventions which provide options for best-fit practices can be used to improve the 
credibility of these claims.
Programmes using market systems approaches should aim to increase the credibility of 
their attribution claims by consciously and transparently selecting best-fit methods that are in 
accordance with their specific context. There is no one-size fits all recipe for attribution.
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Appendix 1: Different philosophies of causality
As we have seen, attribution depends on our ability to establish causality between an 
intervention and an observed effect. This paper first explores different philosophical views 
on causality, because “we have to know what causation is before we can start to look for it” 
(Mumford & Anjum, 2013:7).
One might ask why philosophy is important. Mumford and Anjum (2013:9) clarify: “There is 
something elusive about causation that makes it a particularly difficult matter to know … the 
supposed causal connection is not itself part of our experience … we have to infer its presence 
from other factors of the situation.” Hence causality is rather a matter of belief, not of fact. There 
are thinkers, including Bertrand Russell for example, who wholly deny the existence of causality. 
Nevertheless, for this exploration of attribution we assume that causality is indeed a real thing 
with real implications for our work in market systems development.
In the following, we briefly introduce different philosophical views on causality20.
Causality as regularity
David Hume was the philosopher who introduced the notion that you cannot actually see 
causal mechanisms. He postulated that only through observation of regularities can we capture 
causality. In its simplest form, his theory says that if one type of event is always followed by 
another, this allows us to believe that the first type of event caused the second. This view is 
called a constant conjunction account.
An important caveat to this view is that a regularity is only a constant conjunction if it occurs 
throughout all time and space. This of course makes it impossible for any human being to decide 
whether an observation indeed involves genuine causality as we cannot possibly observe all of 
time and space. This means that we cannot in effect differentiate between genuinely causally 
connected events and coincidentally increased frequencies of co-occurrences of two events. 
Nevertheless, regularity remains a central aspect of our everyday approach to causality.
Necessity, contingency or probability
A different view of causality assumes that for an event to cause another event, the second event 
must be more than just a mere possibility among others but a necessary consequence of the 
cause. This view is called necessitarianism. Necessitarianism does not allow any contingency in 
causal relations, and in its purest says that the world is entirely deterministic. This is the opposite 
to Hume’s view, which allows complete contingency.
There is a variation on the necessitarian view that allows for more complex causal relations, 
namely that almost every effect could have several causes. We can, for example, find conditions 
that are necessary but not sufficient, which means that they could not cause a change on 
their own but are essential as part of a package to make the change occur. Conditions can be 
seen as non-necessary but sufficient if they can cause something on their own but also if other 
conditions exist that could cause the change.
As a reaction to necessitarianism, the notion of indeterministic causality emerged. This view 
sees a cause as something that increases the probability that something will happen while not 
ensuring it. This puts causality somewhere between necessitarianism and complete contingency.
Counterfactual dependence
Some scholars state that to know what caused something we need to find a “difference maker” 
and understand what would have happened if this difference maker had not been there – this is 
called a counterfactual dependence test. 
From a philosophical point of view, this makes causality dependent not on something that is 
there, but on something that is not, which can be problematic. The question is whether the 
counter-fact depends purely on our imagination (called fictionalism), which is a rather weak basis 
20  This overview draws heavily on the very short but invaluable introduction to causation by Mumford and Anjum (2013).
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for an understanding of causality in the real world; or whether there are, as some philosophers 
postulate, an infinite number of parallel worlds which all differ in only one respect from each other.
Instead of relying on mere fictions or parallel worlds, there are instances in the real world where 
we can actually produce two situations that only differ by one fact. This idea is used for example 
in randomised controlled trials. It is, however, as Mumford and Anjum put it, “one thing to use 
some sort of counterfactual dependence as a test of causation and another thing to say that 
causation consists in such dependence” (2013:59). Nevertheless, the use of counterfactual 
dependence to test for causality is justified in principle. 
Reductionism and emergence
Physicalicism sees the essence of causality in the transfer of a conserved physical quantity 
such as energy, momentum or electrical charge between cause and effect. While this notion 
of causality seems, attractive and is easily accessible, it has difficulties explaining complex 
phenomena like economies or human behaviour. There are two reactions to this.
Firstly, reductionism postulates that all higher-level phenomena can be explained in terms of 
lower-level phenomena. Hence according to this view, complex phenomena should also be 
reducible to some basic physical phenomena. This view is contrary to real-world observations. 
For example, while biochemistry can explain in very fundamental terms how the human body 
works, it fails to explain things like consciousness.
Secondly, the view called emergentism says that certain higher-level phenomena “emerge” 
at that level and are not merely the sum of their lower-level parts. This entails that certain 
causal characteristics only occur at that higher level. To use the same example, this view sees 
consciousness as emerging from interactions in the human body while not being reducible to the 
parts of the human body. At the same time, it allows consciousness to assume causal agency, 
for example over human behaviour, that the individual parts of the body could not assume.
Inherent causal powers
Instead of looking for causality as something separate from the involved entities or events, 
dispositionalism postulates that individual objects contain their own dispositional properties or 
“causal powers”. These causal powers can exist as both manifested (e.g. the shape of an object) 
or unmanifested (e.g. if something is fragile it only manifests itself when it hits the floor). These 
powers can vary in strength and are highly context sensitive. A slight change in context can lead 
to a huge difference in outcome. This means that the effect of the causal powers varies both in 
the extent to which they manifest and whether they manifest at all. Or to quote Mumford and 
Anjum again: “Causes tend or dispose towards their effects, where this is short of necessity but 
much more than pure contingency” (2013:102). 
Mumford and Anjum use smoking as an example. Smoking has causal power towards 
developing cancer, which means that those who smoke manifest a disposition towards cancer. 
This does not mean that everyone who smokes necessarily develops cancer. Cancer is a very 
complex causal phenomenon and just a small change in circumstances can make a difference to 
whether somebody in fact gets it or not.
There are two different views on how dispositions are manifested. Some think that causal powers 
need to be triggered by a “stimulus condition”. Others instead think that dispositions form “mutual 
manifestation partnerships”, producing together what neither could have produced alone. 
In this section we briefly introduced several relevant philosophical views on causality. We can 
distil the following insights from these different views:
•	 Causality is more than pure regularity.
•	 Causes do not necessitate their effects nor are the effects completely contingent. Causes 
can be seen as propensities, increasing the probability of an effect to occur. 
•	 Counterfactual dependence can be used to test for causality.
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•	 A causal mechanism cannot be found in a reductionist way; indeed, some causal powers 
only reside in the whole that emerges from the parts.
•	 Causality does not reside outside interacting elements but is inherent in them in the 
form of dispositional properties or causal powers, which might only manifest when being 
stimulated or when combined with other causal powers.
Appendix 2: Complexity and emergence
The argument that social change is complex and that this has specific implications for attributing 
change is commonly expressed both in the academic literature and by practitioners. Aspects that 
are often mentioned when talking about complex systems are that they consist of a high number 
of interconnected and interdependent agents; that there are feedback processes that lead to 
non-linear dynamics; or that the agents are adaptive, i.e. that they adapt their strategy based 
on the feedback that they gather locally (Jenal & Cunningham, 2015; Jones, 2011; Ramalingam 
et al., 2008). Two aspects that are mentioned most frequently in connection with attribution are 
emergence and the unpredictability of causal chains. While the latter is self-explanatory, the 
former needs more explanation.
Emergence is a process of the elements in a system self-organising into a qualitatively 
novel state of interrelation, and hence it is a higher-level order. Emergence occurs when 
previously uncorrelated elements or processes in a system suddenly become coordinated and 
interconnected (Juarrero, 1999). Juarrero (1999) uses the so-called Rayleigh–Bénard convection 
in a liquid that is heated as an example of emergence taken from a physical system. In the 
process of increasing heat from below, the molecules of the liquid suddenly and spontaneously 
self-organise and a regular macro-pattern of convection cells emerges. Also in human systems, 
spontaneous order emerges, leading to structures that enable more effective interactions 
between individuals, such as habits, social norms or the rule of law (Cunningham & Jenal, 2016).
As the example of social norms and the rule of law show, emergent structures can in and of 
themselves have causal powers. A social norm can cause somebody to do something (or not 
do something). This “internal” causal structure in complex human systems is the reason some 
scholars talk about complex human systems being dispositional (Snowden, 2011; Juarrero, 
1999), i.e. having inherent causal powers that cannot be known in advance but influence the 
outcome of each intervention. These causal influences can also not be captured by variables or 
conditions.
Appendix 3: Paradigms for inferring causal connections
In Appendix 2 we described different philosophies of causality and different modes of causal 
explanation. In addition, there are different ways to make causal claims from data and to 
show the strength of inferred causal connections. The two most common ones are frequentist 
inference and Bayesian inference. 
Frequentist logic
Frequentist inference statistically analyses the evidence that has been collected with regard to 
a hypothesis (for example that the independent variable X influences the dependent variable Y). 
The analysis of the data either leads to a “true or false” conclusion from a significance test (i.e. 
that the effect of X on Y is significant), or to a conclusion in the form of a given sample-derived 
confidence interval that covers the true value (i.e. the calculated net impact of X on Y that lies 
within a specified confidence interval).
Frequentist logic of inference is employed in successionist models of causal explanation, where 
large amounts of sample data are statistically analysed either to find similarity or differences 
within the data.
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Bayesian logic
Rather than producing “true or false” statements about causal connections between variables, 
Bayesian inference aims to improve the confidence of the researcher in the validity of the 
inference claim. Or in other words, the goal of evidence gathering is to update our confidence 
in a hypothesis. This process is also called “Bayesian updating”. This updating always occurs 
as a matter of degree; we can never absolutely confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. Applied in 
monitoring and evaluation, it helps practitioners to improve the confidence in the validity of their 
hypothesised causal mechanisms.
Bayesian updating is often used in evaluations that use a generative approach to causality. 
Bayesian logic allows them to continuously refine the underlying hypotheses, Theories of Change 
or causal mechanisms and systematically increase the confidence in the postulated theory.
